Abstract-In a previous paper, it was shown that the (minimal) modal logic MŁ c n with fuzzy accessibility relations over the finite-valued Łukasiewicz logic Ł n and a corresponding multimodal logic mMŁ c n (with a modality a for each value a in the n-valued Ł n -chain) had the same expressive power when the language is extended with truth-constants. In this paper we partially extend these results when replacing the underlying logic Ł n by the infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic (with rational truth constants in the language). We prove that the (standard) tautologies of the modal logic MŁ c (resp. mMŁ c ) are in fact the common tautologies of all the logics MŁ c n (resp. all the logics mMŁ c n ) when letting n vary over N. This fact opens the door to show an alternative proof of the finite model property for these logics and hence their decidability.
Introduction and preliminaries
Theoretical studies of fuzzy or many-valued modal logics on different issues have attracted an increasing attention in the last years, both following general and foundational approaches e.g. in [16] , [2] , [3] , [7] , [14] , as well as focusing on particular families of logics, mainly those based on Gödel fuzzy logic [5] , [4] , [6] , [10] , [9] , on Łukasiewicz logic [13] , [1] or even on Product fuzzy logic [17] .
In this paper we follow the latter path, and focus our attention on modal logics based on Łukasiewicz logics. In [2] it was shown that the (minimal) modal logic MŁ c n with fuzzy accessibility relations over the n-valued Łukasiewicz logic Ł n and a corresponding multi-modal logic mMŁ c n (with a modality a for each value a in the n-valued Ł nchain) have the same expressive power when the language is extended with truth-constants. In this paper we partially extend these results when replacing the underlying logic Ł n by the infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic (with rational truth constants in the language). We prove that the (standard) tautologies of the modal logic MŁ c (resp. mMŁ c ) are in fact the common tautologies of all the logics MŁ c n (resp. all the logics mMŁ c n ) when letting n vary over N. From this, it can be shown that these logics enjoy the finite model property and hence they are decidable. Some of the decidability results are in fact new proofs of Hájek's results in [12] about decidability of Fuzzy Description Logics with semantics over the standard MV-chain, and their extensions when rational truth-values are included in the language.
The paper is structured as follows. After this short introduction, we recall in Section 2 the needed and relevant results in [2] , [3] . In Section 3, the modal logic MŁ c is introduced and its tautologies are characterized as the intersection of the tautologies of MŁ c n for every n ∈ N. In Section 4 a complete calculus is given for its corresponding multi-modal logic. In Section 5 we show some decidability results for these modal systems. We conclude with some remarks and open questions.
Preliminaries
Let Ł n be the n-valued Łukasiewicz logic and let L n = (L n , , →, 0, 1), with L n = {0, 1 n−1 , . . . , n−2 n−1 , 1}, be the nelement MV chain. It is well known that Ł n is axiomatizable and it is complete with respect to evaluations over L n . If we add a truth constant a for each a ∈ L n and suitable bookkeeping axioms, the corresponding logic Ł c n is also complete w.r.t. evaluations over L n such that for all e, e(a) = a. In [3] the authors axiomatize the minimal modal logic over Ł c n with a necessity operator , denoted by MŁ c n , by the following axioms and rules:
• The set of axioms is the smallest set closed under substitutions containing
MP rule, i.e. ϕ, ϕ → ψ ψ and monotonicity rule, i.e. ϕ → ψ implies ϕ → ψ
This logic is complete with respect to the Kripke style semantics defined by structures M = W, S, where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
• S is a binary fuzzy relation on W valued in L n , and
where, for each v ∈ W , v is an evaluation function assigning to each propositional variable a value in L n .
As usual the evaluation function is extended to propositional formulas in the usual way in n-valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants (with || a v = a for all a ∈ L n and v ∈ W ) and to modal formulas as:
A possibility operator ♦ can be defined as usual by duality as ¬ ¬.
On the other hand in [2] a multi-modal system over Ł c n , that will denoted by mMŁ c n , is defined by adding to Ł c n a family of necessity operators a , one for each a ∈ L n \ {0}. This multi-modal logic have been axiomatized by the following axioms and rules:
• The set of axioms is the smallest set closed under substitutions containing -an axiomatic basis for Ł n -book-keeping axioms:
MP rule, i.e. ϕ, ϕ → ψ ψ and the necessitation rule: from ϕ infer b ϕ (for every b ∈ L n \ {0}).
This multi-modal logic was proved to be complete with respect to the same Kripke style semantics above mentioned, only by stipulating the following condition for the a modalities: given a structure M = W, S, , we define for every v ∈ W and a ∈ L n \ {0},
Observe that the semantics of each a is given by a crisp Kripke model obtained by taking the a-cut of S (a crisp relation) as its accessibility relation and thus satisfying axiom K, the normality axiom. Moreover we can define the corresponding possibility operators ♦ a as ¬ a ¬ and thus having the following evaluation function:
As it is costumary, it is assumed above that inf / 0 = 1 and sup / 0 = 0. Actually, the modal and multi-modal system presented above have the same expressive power. Indeed, as shown in [2] , both is definable in mMŁ The fact that any MŁ c -tautology ϕ is a MŁ c n -tautology (provided that all constants in ϕ belong to L n ) is an easy consequence of the following facts: In order to prove the converse inclusion we will use results of Hájek in [11, pp. 135-137] proving that the first order [0, 1] Ł -tautologies coincide with the common first order Ł ntautologies for all n 2. First we need an auxiliary result. Lemma 1. Let n be any odd natural number greater than 2 and let f n be the function f n : [0, 1] −→ L n defined by:
where k ranges over natural numbers. Then for any a, b, c
The lemma is proved by an easy computation by cases. As a corollary we obtain the following corollary. Corollary 1. For each odd natural number n > 2, if S is a [0, 1]-valued fuzzy relation on a set W , the relation S n defined by S n (u, v) = f n (S(u, v)), is a L n -valued fuzzy relation on W . Moreover if S further satisfies reflexivity, symmetry, -transitivity, or separability, then S n satisfies the same properties.
Now we adapt the notion of distance between first order models in [11, Def. 5.4 .28]) to define a distance between Kripke models (where the fuzzy accessibility relation is the only binary predicate). Let M = W, S, and M = W, S , be two [0, 1]-valued Kripke models with the same set of worlds. We define
Finally, for a finite set of variables X ⊂ Var, define:
Note that this distance can be applied indistinctly if M and/or M are L n -valued models. (
and ε > 0, there is n > 2 for which the L n -valued Kripke model M n = W, S n , n satisfies
(ii) Let X be the set of variables appearing in ϕ. Define the complexity of ϕ as follows: τ(ϕ) = 0 if ϕ is propositional variable or a constant, τ(ϕ → ψ) = max(τ(ϕ), τ(ψ)) + 1 and τ( ϕ) = τ(ϕ). Now, for a fixed ε > 0, take δ = ε 2 τ(ϕ) . Then, if we apply [11, Lemma 5.4 .29], using d X (M , M n ), we obtain for each world v ∈ W that the following inequality holds: | ϕ v − ϕ n v |< ε. And now we are ready to prove the theorem. We have already proved one inclusion. To prove the other one, suppose that ϕ, in the language of MŁ c , is not an MŁ c -tautology, i.e., there is a Kripke model M and a world w ∈ W such that ϕ w < 1. By Lemma 2, taking ε < 1 − ϕ w , there is an odd natural n and a L n -valued model M n such that ϕ n w < 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
As an easy corollary we have the following.
Corollary 2. Theorem 1 is also valid if the Kripke models are restricted to models such that the accessibility relations satisfy either reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity or separability, or they are restricted to similarity relations.
We
Now, let L be the axiomatic system defined taking as axioms the smallest set closed under substitutions containing;
• an axiomatic basis for Ł
• book-keeping axioms (a * b) ↔ (a * b), for all rationals a, b ∈ [0, 1] and * ∈ { , →}, 
The multi-modal approach
In the introduction we have recalled the finite-valued multimodal logic mMŁ c n , where we have for each a ∈ L n both a truth constant a and a modal operator a . We have also mentioned that mMŁ c n is complete with respect to a corresponding class of L n -valued Kripke models, and that it has the same expressive power as MŁ c n . In this section we first define an expansion of mMŁ c n by introducing in the language a modal operator a for each rational a ∈ [0, 1]. The semantics for this system, that we will denote by mMŁ 
Taking inspiration in the axiomatizations in [8] and in [3] for modal logics with crisp accessibility relations, we introduce the following axiomatic system for the multimodal logic mMŁ + n . Definition 1. The set of axioms of mMŁ + n is the smallest set closed under substitutions containing:
• axioms of Ł n with truth constants, It is easy to check that the axioms and inference rules of mMŁ + n are sound with respect to the semantic just defined. It is worth noticing the logic mMŁ + n is a bit redundant for interpreting a set of infinite dense modalities with a finite number of truth values. To prove completeness we use the canonical model technique and to this end we define the canonical model by the following steps: 1) Define W can as the set of propositional homomorphisms of modal formulas into L n (taking as new propositional variables all the formulas starting with ) evaluating all theorems of mMŁ + n to 1. Notice that for these homomorphisms we can easily verify that for all 
can } Lemma 3. The fuzzy relation S can satisfies the following property:
• for each a ∈ L n , S a can is the a-cut of the relation S can . Proof. To prove this lemma we need the continuity rule. It is well known that, for each rational a, S a can is the a-cut of the relation S can if and only if, ∩{S b can :
can . In such a case there is an (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ ∩{S b can : b < a} that does not belong to S a can . Take a formula ϕ such that u 2 (ϕ) = 1 and u(ϕ) = 1 for all u = u 2 . Such a formula always exists by McNaughton theorem. It is obvious that ♦ b ϕ is a theorem for all b < a but ♦ a ϕ is not a theorem, in contradiction with the continuity rule. As a consequence we have the following completeness result.
Theorem 2. For any n, mMŁ + n is complete for theorems with respect to the intended L n -valued Kripke semantics.
Due to this completeness result the following two statements hold true as well:
• If we consider the fragment of mMŁ c n with only one necessity operator a , then it would be equivalent to the fragment with only another operator b , since they would be both complete with respect to the same class of crisp Kripke models.
• The logic mMŁ + n is a conservative expansion of both mMŁ c n and all the previous fragments with only one necessity operator a .
Moreover we could consider the logic mMŁ + defined as mMŁ + n but replacing Ł n as base logic by Ł. Although we do not have an axiomatization of this logic, the semantics is clear and defined accordingly, and thus we can consider the set of its tautologies. Then we have the analogous of Theorem 1 for the multimodal setting. 
Thus, in mMŁ c , one could say that ϕ is semantically definable as the infinitary conjunction {ā → a ϕ : a ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1])}.
Decidability of MŁ
In this section, when talking about a modal logic we will actually refer to its set of valid formulas. In what follows, we prove that the minimal modal logic MŁ and some of its conservative extensions have the finite model property (FMP in short). This result was first reported by Hájek in [12] , but there, he uses a systematic reduction of problems of satisfiability and validity in Description logic to the same problems in Propositional logic. Instead of that reduction, we propose to use a many-valued generalization of the classical filtration method. We understand that this generalization is itself a technical contribution which could be useful for future research.
Coming back to the main goal in this section, recall that we say a logic L has the FMP if for every formula ϕ that does not belong to L (i.e. it is not L-valid), there exists a finite L-model M where ϕ is not valid in M . To prove that MŁ has the FMP, we proceed in the following way. First, we assume that a formula ϕ is not valid in the class of all and a world v ∈ W , such that ϕ v < 1. According to Lemma 2, there is an odd natural n and a L n -valued model M n such that ϕ v < 1. To complete the proof, we apply a filtration on the L n -valued model M n to obtain a finite model M n such that ϕ [v] < 1.
To this end, we need to introduce the notion of filtration. We start by defining, for any formula ϕ, the set Φ ϕ of all sub-formulas of ϕ. Note that Φ ϕ is always finite and it also has the property of being closed under sub-formulae. We have also to introduce the notion of equivalent worlds and the classes of equivalence of worlds, in a model:
and a set of formulae Φ we say that w and w are equivalent worlds with respect to M and Φ (written w ∼ = Φ w ) if and only if for all formulae ψ ∈ Φ : ψ w = ψ w (note that we don't say anything about the formulae that are not in Φ). We shall say that a subset of W is the Φ-equivalence class of w (in W ) if and only if it consists of all and only those worlds in W which are equivalent to w with respect to Φ. We use the notation [w] for this equivalence class. Analogously, we can define [ψ] for a formula ψ as the set of all worlds in W which are ψ-equivalent.
Next step is to define a filtration with respect to a set of formulae Φ which is closed under sub-formulae. We can now state and prove the fundamental theorem related to the filtration.
is any model, Φ is any set of formulae (not necessarily finite) which is closed under sub-formulae, and M = W , S , is any filtration of M through Φ. Then for every formula ψ ∈ Φ and for every w ∈ W ,
Proof. The proof is by structural induction over modal formulas ψ ∈ Φ. If ψ is a propositional variable, the theorem holds by the definition of in a filtration. The relevant induction step is when ψ = θ . We divide the proof in two cases:
) By definition,
By condition 3 in Definition 2 the antecedent of the last implication is greater than S(w, w ). Then, replacing S with S, we obtain that the last expresion is less or equal to:
) By condition 4 in Definition 2, we know that for all w ∈ W :
Hence the left side of the last inequation is independent of [w ], then we are able to take infimum on the right side. Thus, we obtain:
In general, conditions 3 and 4 in Definition 2 do not uniquely determine S . Actually, they allow us to choose any fuzzy relation S in the interval S S S where:
Indeed, S and S satisfy conditions 3 and 4 in Definition 2, respectively. The fact that S satisfies condition 4 can be shown in the following way. By definition of satisfiability in a world, we have:
In addition, by definition of classes of equivalence and because of θ ∈ Φ, we know that ∀v ∈ [x] : θ v = θ x and ∀u ∈ [y] : θ u = θ y . Then, we can rewrite the previous inequation as follows:
∀v ∈ [x] and ∀u ∈ [y] : θ v S(x, y) θ u .
In particular, we are able to point out that: As in the classical case, the filtration defined by S will be called the coarsest and the filtration defined by S will be called the greatest.
It is worth mentioning that a relation S between S and S may be neither symmetrical nor transitive even if the original S is. However, we are always able to construct such relations from filtrations as the following proposition proves.
Proposition 2. Given a symmetrical (resp. transitive) fuzzy Kripke model we can always define a symmetrical (resp. transitive) filtration of the original model.
Proof. It is enough to consider the coarsest filtration with S which is symmetrical (resp. transitive) if the original relation S is symmetrical (resp. transitive).
A very important property of filtrations is that they are finite whenever the "filter" Φ is finite as it is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose M is a filtration of a L n -valued Kripke model M through a set Φ which is finite. Then M contains at most n |Φ| worlds.
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 3, we have the following result.
Theorem 5. The logic MŁ is decidable.
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we are able to prove that the logics of several subclasses of fuzzy Kripke models have the FMP. These results do not immediately follow using Hájek's approach because it is not clear what happens when new axioms involving roles are included. Moreover, we can extend the last result for MŁ c by including the expression ∀a ∈ L n : ā [w] = a in Condition 2 of Definition 2. In addition, since the logic mMŁ
